Case Summaries

Bankruptcy Law

[02/02] Gentry v. Siegel
In bankruptcy proceedings in which former employees of the debtor filed claims for unpaid overtime wages, the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of a Rule 9014 motion and its refusal to allow the claimants to pursue class actions is affirmed, where: 1) the bankruptcy court was within its discretion to rule that the bankruptcy process would provide a process superior to the class action process for resolving the claims of former employees; 2) notice of the bankruptcy process to the named claimants was not constitutionally deficient; and 3) with respect to unnamed claimants, the named claimants lacked standing to challenge the notice.

[01/30] Matter of Thorpe Insulation Co.
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's orders denying a creditor's motion to compel arbitration and disallowing its claim is affirmed, where: 1) the resolution of the creditor's claim was a core matter in the bankruptcy; 2) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the creditor's motion to compel arbitration; 3) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give the creditor further opportunity for discovery; 4) the creditor's claim was properly disallowed because because the debtor's covenants in a settlement agreement were purported prepetition waivers of the protections of the Bankruptcy Code, which need not be permitted.

[01/27] Matter of Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc.
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings involving the question whether the debtor was subject to the single asset real estate provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the district court's holding that the single asset real estate provisions applied is affirmed, where: 1) the debtor, which existed solely to operate a 92-unit apartment complex, could be characterized as a single asset real estate debtor under the Bankruptcy Code; 2) the plain language of the Code gives no basis for a "whole business enterprise" exception to single asset real estate debtor status that would allow the court to consider parent corporation and sister subsidiaries; and 3) the district court did not err in its approach to granting relief from the automatic stay by leaving questions about whether the debtor timely took timely corrective action to the bankruptcy court in the first instance.

[01/25] Flores v. Kmart Corp.
In a wrongful death action brought against a corporation that had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy pursuant to which a bankruptcy court had entered an order confirming a reorganization plan and discharging all known and unknown claims against the corporation, the trial court's demurrer dismissal of the complaint is reversed, where on the limited record of bankruptcy proceedings provided by the corporation, and consistent with Fourteenth Amendment due process principles, the corporation failed to demonstrate, at the demurrer stage, that the approval of the reorganization plan barred all of the plaintiffs' claims.

[01/24] In the Matter of Thorpe Insulation Co.
In a bankruptcy case in which several insurance companies that did not reach settlements with the debtors were not allowed to challenge the Chapter 11 reorganization plan, the district court order issuing and affirming the plan is reversed with instructions on remand, where: 1) the appeal was not equitably moot; 2) the appellants met statutory, constitutional, and prudential standing requirements; 3) the appellants had standing in bankruptcy court to object to confirmation of the plan; and 4) anti-assignment provisions contained in contracts between the appellants and debtors were preempted by federal bankruptcy law.

[01/06] Vegas Diamond Properties, LLC v. FDIC
In an appeal from a judgment of the district court dissolving a Temporary Restraining Order on the ground that the anti-injunction provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act precluded it from enjoining the FDIC from conducting a trustee's sale of certain real properties, appeal is dismissed as moot where the subject properties were sold prior to appeal.

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Family Law

[02/03] In re Gabriel K.
On appeal from an order of the juvenile court declaring minors to be dependent children and denying the request of their mother for reunification services, the order is affirmed, where: 1) the juvenile court's denial of further reunification services to the mother for her younger son was consistent with the legislative intent and thus, fell within the spirit of the reunification services statute; 2) the evidence before the juvenile court supported its conclusion that the mother failed to make reasonable efforts to treat her drug issues; and 3) the mother demonstrated no basis for setting aside the juvenile court's decision to deny reunification services.

[02/02] Southerland v. City of New York
In a suit under 42 USC Section 1983 asserting that a New York City children's services caseworker entered the plaintiffs' home unlawfully and effected an unconstitutional removal of children into state custody, the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant caseworker is: 1) affirmed with respect to the dismissal of the father's substantive due process claim; but 2) vacated with respect to the father's and his children's Fourth Amendment unlawful-search and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims and the children's unlawful-seizure claim, where the district court wrongfully concluded that the caseworker was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to all of the claims against him.

[02/02] Marriage of Walker
In a family court proceeding in which the recipient of a California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS) disability allowance challenged earlier family court orders awarding a community property interest in the allowance to his former spouse, the family court's denial of the appellant's motion to set aside the earlier orders is reversed, where the family court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the recipient had made "no mistake" in agreeing that his spouse had a community property interest in his disability allowance and thus should not have denied his motion on this basis.

[02/02] Marriage of Wahl
On appeal from an order requiring an ex-wife to pay to her former husband $552,153.28 in attorney's fees and costs as a sanction because of her conduct with respect to two post-dissolution orders, the order is affirmed, where the record disclosed no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award, and additional sanctions are imposed against the appellant and her appellate attorneys on a finding that the appeal is frivolous.

[01/31] T.W. v. Superior Court (San Diego County Health and Human Servs. Agency)
In proceedings in mandate to review an order designating the specific placement of a dependent child after termination of parental rights, the petition is granted with directions, where the district court abused its discretion by denying a petition by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency to remove the child from the home of his prospective adoptive parent, because the district court did not give appropriate weight to the legislature's goal of securing an adoptive home for a dependent child that is free from the influences of criminal activity and substance abuse.

[01/26] Tracy J. v. Superior Court
On a petition by developmentally disabled parents for review of juvenile court orders terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the petition is granted and a writ of mandate is issued, where the parents did not receive reasonable family reunification services from the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency, which unreasonably limited visitation services.

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Property Law & Real Estate

[02/06] Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. US
In a suit brought by the former operator of a resort facility on federal land, seeking compensation from the United States for facilities that were allegedly retained and used by the Bureau of Land Management or by the resort operator's successor, the Court of Federal Claims' dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim is affirmed, where: 1) the trial court erred in concluding that the issues were identical to those in another case, and thus issue preclusion did not apply; but 2) the United States did not require the retention of the facilities under Public Law 96-375, so they remained the property of the resort operator and were abandoned.

[01/27] Matter of Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc.
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings involving the question whether the debtor was subject to the single asset real estate provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the district court's holding that the single asset real estate provisions applied is affirmed, where: 1) the debtor, which existed solely to operate a 92-unit apartment complex, could be characterized as a single asset real estate debtor under the Bankruptcy Code; 2) the plain language of the Code gives no basis for a "whole business enterprise" exception to single asset real estate debtor status that would allow the court to consider parent corporation and sister subsidiaries; and 3) the district court did not err in its approach to granting relief from the automatic stay by leaving questions about whether the debtor timely took timely corrective action to the bankruptcy court in the first instance.

[01/25] Otay Mesa Property, L.P. v. US
On appeal from a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims awarding plaintiffs $3,043,051, plus interest, for the temporary taking of a blanket easement over five parcels of land and limiting the government's liability to the taking of an easement over those five parcels and limiting the period of the taking to April of 1999 to October of 2008, the judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part, where: 1) the Claims Court erred when it concluded that the government's taking of the easement was a temporary rather than a permanent physical taking, resulting in an erroneous calculation of the plaintiffs' damages; and 2) the Claims Court did not err in limiting the government's liability.

[01/25] General Development Co., L.P. v. City of Santa Maria
On appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered in favor of the City of Santa Maria after the trial court ruled that a developer's petition for writ of mandate was time barred by Government Code section 65009 for failure to timely challenge the denial of a zone change, judgment is affirmed, where the trial court did not err in ruling that City's denial of the developer's rezoning application was a "decision of a legislative body to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance" within the meaning of section 65009.

[01/20] Center for Sierra Nevada Conservation v. County of El Dorado
In a case arising from the County of El Dorado's adoption of an oak woodland management plan and mitigation fee program without an environmental impact report (EIR), the district court's judgment in favor of the county is reversed, where: 1) the county could not rely on an earlier program EIR for its conclusion that the adoption of the plan and fee program would have no greater adverse environmental effect than that already anticipated in the program EIR, and its adoption of a negative declaration; and 2) the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) required a tiered EIR to be conducted prior to the county's adoption of the plan and fee program.

[01/19] Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. US
In a suit for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment for an alleged taking based on the Army Corps of Engineers' denial of a landowner's proposal to operate a "mitigation bank" on its property, the Court of Federal Claims' dismissal for failure to state a claim is affirmed, where the Claims Court did not err in holding that the landowner did not possess a legally cognizable Fifth Amendment property interest in a mitigation bank instrument.

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Injury & Tort Law

[02/03] Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Roberts
In a suit brought by an insurer seeking a declaratory judgment that it was required to indemnify its insured for no more than 40 percent of a state court judgment because it had covered its insured for no more than 40 percent of the time in which the state court plaintiff was exposed to lead poisoning, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part, where it was correct in allocating the insurer's liability using the pro-rata time on-the-risk, and its decision to use the plaintiff's date of birth as the starting point for the period in which she was exposed to lead poisoning was sound; and 2) reversed in part, where the district court erred in holding the insurer liable for 24 months of coverage rather than 22, since under the insurance contract, coverage ended when the property was sold.

[02/02] Lore v. City of Syracuse
In a case alleging illegal retaliation against a city police officer under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL) because of her complaints of gender discrimination, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part where the city's arguments regarding the availability of reputation damages, evidentiary and instructional errors, and excessive damages for emotional distress presented no basis for disturbing the judgment; and 2) vacated in part where there was merit in plaintiff's contentions regarding the liability of the city's corporation counsel, and the district court erred in dismissing her principal gender discrimination claims under the HRL on the basis that she had suffered no materially adverse employment action.

[02/01] Maxton v. Western States Metals
In a suit alleging negligence and strict liability causes of action based on personal injuries as a result of working with metal products manufactured by the defendants and supplied to the plaintiff's employer, the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants on demurrers is affirmed, where: 1) the metal products involved were not inherently dangerous, and no other circumstances justified imposing liability on the defendants for the plaintiff's injuries under the component parts doctrine; 2) the plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing there was a reasonable possibility that the deficiencies in the complaint could be cured by amendment.

[01/30] Sennett v. US
In a suit by a photojournalist seeking money damages against the federal government for FBI agents' alleged violations of the Privacy Protection Act (PPA) stemming from a search of her apartment, the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the United States is affirmed, where: 1) the facts as alleged showed that the officers had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was involved in criminal activity; and 2) the search of her home related to the investigation of that activity, so that the "suspect exception" to the PPA applied.

[01/27] AE v. County of Tulare
In a suit arising from the sexual assault of a minor by his foster brother, alleging against the county that ran the foster home a claim under 42 USC section 1983 for deliberate indifference and claims for negligence pursuant to California statutes, the district court's dismissal of all claims against the county is reversed, where: 1) the district court abused its discretion when it denied leave to amend the complaint to cure defects in the section 1983 claim; 2) the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the derivative liability claims against the county with prejudice and without leave to amend when it granted leave to amend as to the allegations regarding defendant county social workers.

[01/27] C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.

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